By CalMax Systems Security Research, founder · Published April 17, 2026 · Last verified: October 23, 2026

Short answer: If your VPN portal has an IPv6 address, attackers can guess passwords against it over IPv6, and IPv4-only blocklists and firewall rules will not stop them. Close the gap with IPv6 deny rules, rate limits and blocks per /64 prefix, MFA, IPv6-aware logging, or by taking IPv6 off the portal if you don’t need it.

When security teams think about VPN brute force attacks, they usually picture credential-guessing against a GlobalProtect or FortiGate portal from IPv4 addresses. Blocklists, rate limits and threat feeds are often built around IPv4 too. That is fine as long as the portal is reachable only over IPv4.

IPv6 is now common. Google reports that about 46% of its users reached Google over IPv6 on October 21, 2026 (the figure runs higher on weekends). That measures users with IPv6 connectivity, not attack traffic, but it shows how many networks, including the hosting and home networks attackers use, can send IPv6 packets (Google IPv6 statistics).

If your portal is dual-stack, check three things: whether your blocklists contain IPv6 entries, whether your firewall rules reference IPv6 address objects, and whether your log parsing and alerts handle IPv6 source addresses. This article explains each gap and what to do about it.

What Are IPv6 VPN Brute Force Attacks?

An IPv6 VPN brute force attack works the same way as its IPv4 counterpart: automated tools attempt to authenticate against a VPN portal by rapidly trying username and password combinations. The difference is the source address. Instead of originating from an IPv4 address like 185.224.128.71, the attack traffic comes from an IPv6 address like 2001:db8:a1b2::1f3e.

IPv6 has 2128 possible addresses, compared to IPv4’s roughly 4.3 billion. Many IPv4 brute force campaigns start by scanning the whole address space to find VPN portals. Scanning all of IPv6 that way is not practical, but attackers have other ways to find IPv6 portals.

Attackers find IPv6-enabled VPN portals through several methods:

Either way, the portal sees login attempts from IPv6 addresses that an IPv4-only blocklist or rule cannot match.

Why IPv6 Is a Blind Spot

The gap comes from configuration, not from anything special about IPv6 attacks. These are the usual places it shows up:

Many Blocklists Are IPv4-Only

IPv6 coverage varies from feed to feed. Many popular free IP feeds publish only IPv4 addresses, or mostly IPv4. Some providers publish IPv6 separately: Spamhaus, for example, offers an IPv6 DROP list (DROPv6) next to its IPv4 DROP list (Spamhaus DROP). ThreatListPro’s list is IPv4-only. Check each feed you use rather than assuming it covers both address families.

Check your feeds: Open each threat feed you import and look for entries that contain colons. If there are none, that feed does nothing for traffic to your portal’s IPv6 address, and you need other controls there.

Firewall Rules Often Skip IPv6

Even when a firewall supports IPv6, security policies often reference only IPv4 address objects, because the ruleset was written before IPv6 was turned on and nobody added IPv6 equivalents. On Palo Alto Networks firewalls, the address objects and External Dynamic Lists in your deny rules may contain only IPv4 entries. On FortiGate, policies may reference address objects but no address6 objects. Both platforms can handle IPv6 here: Palo Alto lists External Dynamic Lists as IPv6-capable (IPv6 support by feature), and Fortinet’s IP address threat feeds accept IPv4 or IPv6 entries (FortiOS threat feeds). The gap is in the rules, not the products.

Log Analysis Misses IPv6

Some SIEM rules, log parsing regex patterns and alerting dashboards were written only for IPv4 address formats. IPv6 addresses look different: they use colons instead of dots, can be shortened with ::, and can be written in more than one form. A log parser or SIEM correlation rule that uses a regex like \d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3} to extract source IPs will silently skip every IPv6 address in the log. The attack happens, the logs record it, but the alerting pipeline never sees it.

Monitoring Gaps

Teams may not have IPv6 traffic dashboards, IPv6 rate limits or IPv6 geolocation lookups. Some do not know their VPN portal is reachable over IPv6 at all, because a dual-stack interface or an AAAA record was added and never reviewed.

How the IPv6 Gap Gets Used

An attacker does not need special tools to benefit from an IPv4-only defense. These are the patterns to plan for:

Switching Address Families

A bot that is blocked on IPv4 by an IP blocklist, a rate limiter or Fail2Ban can keep trying the same portal over IPv6 if the host has IPv6 connectivity. If those controls only cover IPv4, nothing stops it, and to the portal it looks like a new source with no history.

Cheap IPv6 From Hosting Providers

The major cloud providers offer IPv6 on virtual machines, and many VPS hosts include an IPv6 range with each server. An attacker renting throwaway servers can get IPv6 addresses with little effort, and a blocklist built from IPv4 observations will not contain them.

Address Rotation Inside a Prefix

A /64, the standard size of one IPv6 subnet, holds 264 addresses, more than the entire IPv4 address space. Hosting customers commonly get a /64 or larger, and the RIPE best-practice document for ISPs recommends giving each customer site a /48 or /56 (RIPE-690). An attacker with one prefix can use a fresh source address for every attempt, so blocking single IPv6 addresses does little. Block, rate limit and count failures by prefix instead: a /64 at minimum, widening to a /56 or /48 when failures keep coming from several /64s in the same larger block.

What about 6to4 and Teredo? These older tunneling methods carry IPv6 inside IPv4. Anycast 6to4 was deprecated in 2015 (RFC 7526), and Google’s statistics show relayed IPv6 is now a tiny share. They matter less for inbound attacks than for outbound policy: if you don’t use them, block IP protocol 41 and Teredo (UDP 3544) at the edge.

Detecting IPv6 Brute Force in Your Logs

The first step toward protection is detection. Here is what to look for on common firewall platforms:

Palo Alto Networks (PAN-OS)

On PAN-OS, GlobalProtect events (Monitor > Logs > GlobalProtect) record the client’s public IP whether it is IPv4 or IPv6. Look for failed portal or gateway logins whose source address contains colons, then check the traffic log for the same addresses to confirm which security rule matched them. If the matching rule is an allow rule with no IPv6 deny above it, your IPv4 blocks are not covering that traffic. See our GlobalProtect hardening guide for the wider checklist.

FortiGate

(On FortiOS 7.6.3 and later, SSL VPN tunnel mode is removed and remote access moves to IPsec VPN; the same IPv6 checks apply there.) FortiGate records SSL-VPN login failures in the VPN event log for both address families. Filter for failed logins and look for source addresses containing colons. Then check what restricts IPv6 sources on the SSL-VPN: the SSL-VPN authentication rules under config vpn ssl settings have separate source-address and source-address6 options (FortiOS CLI reference), so an IPv4 restriction does not cover IPv6. Our FortiGate failed-login guide covers reading these logs.

Generic Syslog

For VPN concentrators that log to syslog, search authentication failures for source addresses that contain colons. Group them by /64 prefix rather than by full address, because a single attacker may use many addresses in one prefix.

Example log pattern to search for:
authentication failed for user admin from 2001:db8:a1b2:c3d4::1f3e port 443

If you search your VPN authentication logs for addresses containing colons and find repeated failures from the same IPv6 prefixes, someone is guessing passwords over IPv6. Check whether those /64 prefixes are covered by any deny rule or feed you use; an IPv4-only list, including ThreatListPro’s, will not contain them.

How to Protect Against IPv6 VPN Brute Force

None of these steps is difficult, but each has to be done on purpose, because IPv4 rules do not carry over to IPv6.

1. Add IPv6 Equivalents to Your Firewall Rules

Audit your firewall policies and make sure every IPv4 deny rule that protects the VPN has an IPv6 equivalent. On Palo Alto firewalls, add IPv6 address objects or an IPv6 External Dynamic List to the deny rules in front of the portal. On FortiGate, create address6 objects (or an IP threat feed with IPv6 entries) and reference them in the policies that protect the SSL-VPN.

2. Use IPv6 Sources Where You Have Them

When you evaluate a threat feed, check whether it contains IPv6 entries at all. ThreatListPro’s list is IPv4-only: it is built from real attacks on live production Palo Alto GlobalProtect VPN portals in the US and blocks known attackers on IPv4, so it does nothing for your IPv6 address. For IPv6, use a feed that does publish IPv6 entries (such as Spamhaus DROPv6, a list of IPv6 netblocks Spamhaus advises not to route) and your own logs: the prefixes that fail logins against your portal are the most relevant IPv6 blocklist you can build.

3. Monitor Both Address Families in Your SIEM

Update SIEM correlation rules and dashboards to handle IPv6: regex patterns that match both formats, IPv6 geolocation lookups, and alerts that fire on repeated authentication failures regardless of address family. For IPv6, aggregate failures by /64 prefix as well as by full address.

4. Take IPv6 Off the Portal If You Don’t Need It

If your users do not need IPv6 for remote access, remove the IPv6 address from the portal and gateway configuration (on GlobalProtect, the IP address set on the portal and gateway; on FortiGate, IPv6 on the SSL-VPN listening interface) and remove the AAAA DNS record. Removing only the AAAA record is not enough, because an attacker who already knows the IPv6 address can still connect to it. Once the portal does not listen on IPv6, IPv6 login attempts cannot reach it. Revisit this when you do need IPv6.

5. Stack Your Defenses

No single control is enough. A layered VPN brute force defense looks like this:

Layers matter more on IPv6. Because single-address blocks are weak on IPv6, rely on prefix blocks, per-prefix rate limits and MFA together. Password spraying, which tries a few common passwords across many accounts, is the pattern these layers have to catch (see password spraying on VPNs).

ThreatListPro’s IPv6 Coverage

ThreatListPro’s list is IPv4-only. Every entry is an IPv4 address or IPv4 CIDR range, 5.4M+ IPv4 addresses in total, taken from real attacks on live production Palo Alto GlobalProtect VPN portals in the US and checked for new attackers every 6 hours. It contains no IPv6 entries.

So if your VPN listens on IPv6, ThreatListPro does not protect that address. Use the controls above for it: IPv6 deny rules, per-prefix rate limits and blocks, MFA, and IPv6-aware logging, or take IPv6 off the portal.

Frequently Asked Questions

Do VPN brute force attacks come from IPv6 addresses?

Yes, if the portal is reachable over IPv6. Attack tools on hosts with IPv6 connectivity, such as cloud servers and home devices, can send login attempts to a portal’s IPv6 address. Google reports that about 46% of its users reached it over IPv6 on October 21, 2026. If you monitor and block only IPv4, you will not catch these attempts.

Why don’t many IP blocklists include IPv6?

Coverage varies by feed. Many free IP feeds publish only IPv4 addresses, while some providers publish IPv6 separately, such as Spamhaus DROPv6. IPv6 also makes single-address lists less useful, because one attacker can use many addresses inside a /64 prefix, so IPv6 lists need to work with prefixes. Check each feed you use for entries that contain colons.

How do I check if my firewall blocks IPv6 brute force attempts?

Review the deny rules in front of your VPN for IPv6 address objects, IPv6 External Dynamic Lists or threat feeds. On Palo Alto Networks firewalls, check whether the EDLs and address objects in the rules protecting GlobalProtect contain IPv6 entries. On FortiGate, check for address6 objects in the relevant policies and for source-address6 settings on the SSL-VPN. Then look in your VPN logs for IPv6 source addresses that no block rule matched.

Does ThreatListPro block IPv6 attackers?

No. ThreatListPro’s list is IPv4-only, so it does not block attackers using IPv6. Pair it with the IPv6 controls in this guide: IPv6 deny rules, per-prefix rate limits and blocks, MFA, or removing IPv6 from the portal.

Should I disable IPv6 on my VPN portal?

If your users do not need IPv6 for VPN access, remove the IPv6 address from the portal and gateway configuration and delete the AAAA record, so IPv6 login attempts cannot reach the portal. Removing only the AAAA record is not enough. If you do need IPv6, make sure your firewall rules, rate limits and monitoring cover both address families.