Since November 11, 2026, attackers have used MSPs’ ScreenConnect consoles to push rogue ScreenConnect clients and a toolkit called SCKit onto managed computers. Cloud-hosted and on-premises servers are both affected. ConnectWise’s initial assessment pointed to third-party RMM+ family extensions; its November 16 update says its investigation is complete but does not name a confirmed entry route. Responding now? Start with the vendor steps, then run the checks below.
Jump to the stepsIf you suspect compromise, isolate affected devices immediately and investigate through EDR or another trusted channel outside ScreenConnect. Include technician workstations that connected to affected endpoints. On-premises admins should disable the identified extensions and update to the latest supported server release. All partners should verify that every technician client runs 26.6.5 or later.
Our Secure ScreenConnect playbook is the step-by-step method we used to secure our own on-premises server during this campaign. Do the vendor steps first. The playbook adds to them; it doesn’t replace them.
Huntress saw two waves of attackers using ScreenConnect’s Run Command feature to install extra, attacker-controlled clients on managed endpoints. The numbers are what Huntress could see, not the whole campaign. The toolkit also tries to spread to technicians who connect, but researchers have not seen that succeed.
| Issue | Affected | Fix or mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 3.1 score 9.9) | ScreenConnect clients before 26.6.5 in cloud and on-premises deployments. A condition in the client may allow files to be transferred and executed through an active remote session without authorization or Host confirmation. ScreenConnect servers are not affected. | 26.6.5 or later (NVD build cutoff 26.6.5.9742). Reinstall host clients, update Access agents and verify technician workstations. |
| CVE-2026-127063 (CVSS 4.0 score 9.3) | The CVE record lists all versions of the third-party DataComm RMM+ extension. Deployments retaining the default secret are exposed to unauthorized extension API access. | No fixed RMM+ version has been announced. Verify the extension is disabled across your instances and keep it disabled pending vendor guidance. |
Huntress observed the November campaign on ScreenConnect builds 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783. The client fix addresses the attempted spread to technicians. Extension disablement and incident response address separate risks. See the ScreenConnect vulnerability guide for patch and upgrade details.
From the ConnectWise advisory updates of November 12, 13 and 16. If you suspect compromise, investigate with your EDR or another tool outside ScreenConnect, and include technician workstations that connected to affected endpoints. This list is containment. Scoping an intrusion is a job for your security team or provider.
Our fully patched on-premises server had no extensions, yet showed unattended sessions we did not recognize. We do not know whether those sessions were related to SCKit.
Do the vendor steps first. After that, hardening the server is its own job, separate from incident response: if you found unauthorized activity, a configuration change does not close the incident. The method we used on our own server is in the Secure ScreenConnect playbook.
Save console and endpoint records before you remove anything. Microsoft’s response guidance says to retain extension, authentication, Run Command and Toolbox records together with process, file, task and registry history, and to verify the complete state of each device before restoring connectivity.
Check the console first, then the endpoints. Compare what you find with the current indicators and hunting queries in the Microsoft SCKit post and Huntress report. No match does not mean you are clean. The indicators keep changing.
c=Exploited marker in installer download commands, such as c=Exploited809 or c=ExploitedNOTUSA.2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091.RelayTrapLiteAlert Run value, a scheduled task named TrapWatch, a C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\ folder, or %TEMP%\sckit-* staging folders.ConnectWiseControl_, CWInstall_ or RelayTrap.Not every unknown session is an SCKit intrusion. On November 13, Huntress reported unfamiliar sessions named after crypto exchanges, such as SRV-BINANCE, KUCOIN-SRV or BACKUP-PROBIT, on at least 118 self-hosted ScreenConnect servers belonging to 109 organizations it protects. It had not seen malicious activity linked to them and found no overlap with the published SCKit indicators. Its leading hypothesis is that they are bait for CVE-2026-84869, the client flaw fixed in 26.6.5, and it could not rule out other goals.
Huntress says technicians should not join sessions they cannot tie to a customer, and that crypto-exchange names, blank company fields or a mismatched client version should trigger a pause and investigation. Update every technician client to 26.6.5 or later. Don’t connect to an unknown session to take a look. Preserve a copy of App_Data\Session.db and its write-ahead log, then delete confirmed unauthorized sessions from the console. Review the preserved session history to see whether any technician joined and whether files, commands or text were sent. If someone already joined with an unpatched client, investigate that workstation through trusted security tooling and review the preserved server records to determine what occurred during the connection. If someone typed credentials into the session, treat them as potentially exposed and rotate them from a trusted device.
A firewall blocklist can reduce scanning and login attempts from listed addresses. Address the ScreenConnect risks by applying the vendor updates, disabling the identified extensions and investigating suspected compromise.
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The Secure ScreenConnect playbook is a $79 PDF with implementation steps, testing and rollback guidance. Buyers get free email support. It is for on-premises deployments and does not apply to ScreenConnect Cloud. There are no refunds. Read the product details before buying to check that it fits your setup.
Partly. Client version 26.6.5, released September 8 to fix CVE-2026-84869, blocks the toolkit's attempted spread from an endpoint to a technician, so update every technician client. The initial access method remains unconfirmed. ConnectWise's November 16 update also tells on-premises partners to update ScreenConnect to the latest supported version. No fixed RMM+ extension version has been announced, so keep the named extensions disabled.
Yes. Early reports were about cloud-hosted consoles, but ConnectWise's November 13 and November 16 updates say researchers are reporting activity against on-premises environments where the named extensions are still enabled. ConnectWise cannot disable extensions on your own server, so you have to do it. Having an extension installed is a reason to act, not proof you were compromised.
Yes. Do the vendor steps first: disable the named extensions, update the server to the latest supported version and technician clients to 26.6.5 or later, revoke sessions and enforce MFA. You can then harden the server itself. Our Secure ScreenConnect playbook is the method we used on our own server. Hardening does not clean up an intrusion that already happened.
SCKit is the name researchers use for the toolkit in the November 2026 ScreenConnect attacks. It installs an extra ScreenConnect client that connects to attacker infrastructure, sets up persistence, and includes RelayTrap, which targets technicians who connect. That extra client works on its own, so removing a session from your console does not clean the endpoint.
ConnectWise confirmed unauthorized access to partner ScreenConnect environments. It found no evidence that its own infrastructure was compromised or that a ScreenConnect vulnerability was used for initial access. Attackers did get into MSPs' ScreenConnect consoles and pushed rogue clients from them. ConnectWise's initial assessment pointed to abuse of third-party extensions in the RMM+ family. Its November 16 update says its investigation is complete but does not name a confirmed initial access method.
Not necessarily, but treat them as a risk. Huntress found sessions named after crypto exchanges, such as SRV-BINANCE or KUCOIN-SRV, on at least 118 self-hosted ScreenConnect servers. It saw no malicious activity linked to them and no overlap with SCKit indicators, but its leading hypothesis is that they are bait for CVE-2026-84869. Don't join sessions you can't tie to a customer. Commands you didn't run, a second client on a real endpoint or new admin users point to an intrusion.
ConnectWise found no evidence that a ScreenConnect vulnerability was used for initial access. It did link SCKit’s attempted spread to the client flaw fixed in 26.6.5. Follow the vendor steps above. If you suspect compromise, isolate affected devices and use EDR or another trusted channel to investigate before restoring connectivity.
Treat it as malware. Preserve evidence first, then remove the rogue client and its persistence with your EDR or another tool outside ScreenConnect. Uninstalling the client alone is not enough. Microsoft warns not to run cleanup scripts recovered from SCKit, because they can redeploy the toolkit. Check the device before you reconnect it, and rebuild it if you can't confirm it's clean.
Primary sources reviewed November 18, 2026.
General VPN and remote-access reading.